David M. Fuqua has again been selected as one of the Best Civil Rights lawyers in Arkansas by “Best Lawyers in America”.
David Fuqua and Patrick Spivey were recently granted three summary judgment motions in favor of administrators and employees of the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office.
In the largest class-action discrimination case in history, the Supreme Court held that there were not sufficient grounds to treat all current or former female employees of Wal-Mart as one class.
David M. Fuqua was recently selected as one of the Best Civil Rights lawyers in Arkansas by “Best Lawyers in America” which is the oldest lawyer-rating publication in the United States. David has over 30 years of trial experience defending governmental entities, elected officials, and government employees in lawsuits alleging constitutional violations.
United States Magistrate Judge Beth Deere – granting MSJ, dismissing claims with prejudice
In Johnson v. Holladay et al., the plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied or delayed his access to dental treatment, which he characterized as deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The plaintiff complained of a toothache on January 22, 2009. He was involved in an altercation with another inmate the following day, and he received medical attention but did not complain of a broken tooth, toothache, or any other dental problem. The plaintiff was examined by a staff nurse on January 28, 2009, and prescribed motrin for pain and warm saltwater rinses. The nurse also placed the plaintiff’s name on the appointment list to see the dentist. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed two grievances requesting to see the dentist, and the Health Services Administrator reviewed his chart, responded to each grievance, and instructed the dental assistant to schedule him for the next available appointment. The plaintiff was ultimately scheduled for an appointment with the dentist on February 27, 2009. The plaintiff elected to have a decaying tooth extracted following this examination.
The court found that none of the five defendants were deliberately indifferent, noting that the plaintiff did not submit any evidence that four of the defendants were even aware of his need for dental treatment. The fifth defendant, the dental assistant, was named in the lawsuit because she is charged with making the dentists’ appointments each week. The court found no merit in the claims against her, as the undisputed evidence showed that she placed the plaintiff’s name in the dental book upon the nurse’s instruction, noted that the plaintiff had to be seen pursuant to the instruction of the Health Services Administrator, and was not aware of any alleged delay in treatment.
The plaintiff also brought an official capacity claim against the facility, arguing that “his initial dental examination was insufficient, that the cursory review of his grievances was inadequate, and that the manner in which dental visits are scheduled at PCRDF is unconstitutional.” The court found no merit to these allegations because the plaintiff failed to follow correct procedure for receiving medical treatment by filing a sick call form and instead chose to file grievances, and because the plaintiff was seen by the nurse and dentist in a relatively reasonable amount of time and put forth no evidence to show that he was injured by the alleged delay in treatment.
United States District Judge Dean Whipple – granting MSJ, dismissing claims with prejudice
In Osborne v. Pulaski County Detention Facility et al., the plaintiffs alleged that they were denied necessary medical treatment while detained at the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility (“PCRDF”). The plaintiffs were incarcerated at the PCRDF as federal detainees, held at the request of the U.S. Marshals. Both plaintiffs were continuously moved from the PCRDF to other jail facilities depending upon the orders of the U.S. Marshals.
The first plaintiff’s medical complaints related to a hernia, and the second plaintiff was diagnosed with boils that he attributed to cancer. The first plaintiff was booked in to the PCRDF seven times, alternately complaining of issues with a hernia and stating that he had no medical complaints. On his seventh intake screening report, he reported a hernia on his left side; later that day, he filed a sick call form requesting surgery and alleging that he was told by a U.S. Marshal that he would be scheduled for surgery at UAMS. PCRDF medical staff responded to his sick call, and the plaintiff was assessed by a nurse, prescribed pain relievers, and scheduled for a visit to the PCRDF clinic. The plaintiff was evaluated by the PCRDF’s physician five days later and scheduled for a follow-up visit, but the physician did not refer the plaintiff to another medical provider for consultation. The plaintiff continued to file sick call forms and grievances, and the PCRDF medical staff continued to evaluate his hernia and provide treatment in the form of pain medication and a scrotum support. During one of his evaluations, the PCRDF nurse noted that the plaintiff was not wearing the scrotum support. The plaintiff was released from PCRDF custody for the final time on November 29, 2007, and during that time, his medical records do not indicate that his hernia ever required immediate surgical treatment.
The second plaintiff complained of boils and a rash, and the PCRDF’s nurse practitioner prescribed a corticosteroid. The plaintiff was evaluated repeatedly, almost weekly and never less than monthly, during the summer and fall of 2007. During this period, the PCRDF physician prescribed antibiotic ointment and oral antibiotics. On August 17, 2007, the plaintiff was transported to UAMS for treatment, where he was prescribed Rifampin. The plaintiff continued to file grievances and sick call forms, and PCRDF medical staff responded to all of his complaints in a timely fashion. On January 23, 2008, the plaintiff was transported to UAMS to receive surgical treatment on his boils, which were properly diagnosed as condyloma and not cancer.
The court dismissed the PCRDF on summary judgment “because county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit.” The remaining official capacity defendants were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to even allege that the PCRDF had an unconstitutional policy or custom and because the plaintiffs’ claims failed to establish a policy or custom that showed deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates. Because the plaintiffs failed to establish an unconstitutional policy or custom, the plaintiffs also could not show that their injuries were caused by such a policy or custom. The plaintiffs’ final claim, against a supervisory defendant in his individual capacity, was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of deliberate indifference or even allege that the supervisor had knowledge of their medical issues. The court concluded overall that the plaintiffs failed to show that their medical treatment was unreasonably delayed and noted that the plaintiffs’ apparent disagreement with decisions regarding their treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Jerome T. Kearney – recommended that MSJ be granted and complaint be dismissed without prejudice
In Stanton v. Holladay et al., the plaintiff alleged that while he was detained at the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility (“PCRDF”), jail officials failed to protect him and were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. On October 14, 2009, the plaintiff was allegedly attacked by his cellmate. The plaintiff was moved into the cell approximately one month prior to the attack because the plaintiff told PCRDF personnel he could get along with any other inmate. Subsequent to the plaintiff’s move, a fellow inmate told the plaintiff that his new cellmate was crazy and had threatened him when they were cellmates. Based on this information, the plaintiff asked Defendant Jackson if he could be moved. Defendant Jackson denied his request and told him to get along with his cellmate. The plaintiff repeated his request to Defendant Jackson two or three more times and told Defendant Hicks that Defendant Jackson had refused to move him. Defendant Jackson denied these requests and no action resulted from the plaintiff’s discussion with Defendant Hicks. On the day of the incident, the plaintiff was in his bunk and his cellmate stood in front of him. The plaintiff told his cellmate to move three times, and then told him to move or he would move him. The cellmate then swung and struck the plaintiff in the face, and the plaintiff jumped out of his bunk and put his cellmate in a headlock. The cellmate slammed the plaintiff’s back into the wall, and Defendant Hicks then entered the cell and broke up the fight. The cellmate was removed from the cell, and the plaintiff alleges he was then denied medical treatment.
The plaintiff did not file a grievance complaining about his room assignment prior to the incident. When he did grieve following the incident, he did not appeal the portion regarding Defendant Jackson’s alleged failure to move him, which resulted in his failure to fully exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). The court did not agree with the defendants’ related argument regarding whether the inmate must state the name of the person their claim is against within the grievance because the defendants did not submit a copy of the inmate grievance procedure and did not allege that the grievance procedure includes such a requirement. However, the court did find that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because his grievance appeal related only to his medical claims, not his claim alleging that the defendants’ failed to protect him from harm.
The defendants also alleged that the plaintiff provided no evidence that any defendant actually knew of a substantial risk of harm, and the plaintiff admitted that he did not tell any defendant of a specific threat from his cellmate. Finally, the defendants argued that because they reasonably believed the risk of harm to the plaintiff was not substantial, they were entitled to qualified immunity.
The court recommended granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice based on the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court also found that the plaintiff’s official capacity claims failed because he did not offer proof of an unconstitutional policy or practice.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. __ (2011)
In the largest class-action discrimination case in history, the Supreme Court held that there were not sufficient grounds to treat all current or former female employees of Wal-Mart as one class. The class-action suit began in 2001 when Betty Dukes, a “greeter” at a northern California Wal-Mart, filed a suit for gender discrimination and sought to certify a class consisting of any and all female employees of Wal-Mart—approximately 1.5 million women.
The Court held the district court’s class-certification inconsistent with Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(a) requires a party seeking class certification to prove that the class has common questions of law or fact. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found no general policy of discrimination; so a finding that one female employee was discriminated against would do nothing to prove discrimination against another female employee. Class certification, therefore, was not appropriate. The Court also found that the employees’ claims for monetary relief could not be class certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because that Rule only allows class certification where the monetary relief is incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief. That was not the case for the female employees of Wal-Mart, whose claims for backpay would have to be adjudicated individually.
Four justices concurred in part and dissented in part. Those justices agreed that class certification was improper under Rule 23(b)(2) but found that a common issue did exist among all the plaintiffs' complaints sufficient to allow the possibility of class certification.